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Much of our commerce and traveling depend on the efficient operation of large scale networks.
Some of those, such as electric power grids, transportation systems, communication networks, and
others, must maintain their efficiency even after several failures, or malicious attacks. We outline
a procedure that modifies any given network to enhance its robustness, defined as the size of its
largest connected component after a succession of attacks, whilst keeping a high efficiency, described
in terms of the shortest paths among nodes. We also show that this generated set of networks is
very similar to networks optimized for robustness in several aspects such as high assortativity and
the presence of an onion-like structure.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, insights provided by network analysis have attracted a lot of attention from practitioners. As
a result, it has been shown that several artificial (e.g. the Internet, electric-grids, etc.) and natural systems (e.g.
chemical reaction networks, food networks, gene regulatory networks, etc.) present characteristics that allows one to
classify them as Complex Networks. Their structure and the dynamics of phenomena taking place on them have been
intensively studied [5], thanks to the availability of large data sets [8].
An important aspect of a network is the capability to withstand failures and fluctuations in the functionality of its
nodes and links. The design of networked infrastructures with these capabilities can be thought of as an optimization
task. An early important work in this field is Albert et al. [1] where the authors showed by numerical simulations that
scale-free networks, while they are robust against random removal of nodes, are much more vulnerable to the removal
of nodes according to their degree. In other words, in a scale-free network if the nodes are removed in decreasing
order of degree, starting with the most connected ones, then the network falls apart very quickly.
In Schneider et al. [9], a procedure is described that successfully modifies scale-free networks so that the largest
connected component still has a considerable size after several attacks targeted at the most connected nodes. This
feature guarantees that there is at least one path connecting a large number of nodes after attacks and is considered
an appropriate definition of robustness. A natural question that follows is the maintenance of network efficiency after
attacks, i.e., a network is efficient in this sense if “good paths” among nodes do not cease to exist after several targeted
failures. Using a consolidated definition of efficiency, we propose an optimization procedure that modifies existing
networks in order to improve their efficiency under targeted attacks.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section Model, we present our measures of robustness, efficiency, and a
method to optimize a specific characteristic of a network. Then, we show in Section Results several comparisons of
optimized and unoptimized networks. We highlight the major points of our contribution in Section Discussion.
MODEL
The proposed methodology is an extension of the work of Schneider et. al [9], who used a hill-climbing procedure to
optimize robustness against targeted attacks. We modify this approach by adding a simulated annealing strategy [4] to
avoid the search getting trapped in local maxima. Previous approaches have successfully used simulated annealing to
increase network robustness [3]. Here however we extend our focus to the following objectives: Robustness, Efficiency,
and a combined measure of both. We create three sets of networks optimized for these cost functions and compare
their characteristics. In what follows, we describe the cost functions and the optimization procedure.
Robustness
The definition of network robustness might change according to a specific application. In this work, we call an
attack the removal of a node of the network, and the robustness we measure by the size of the largest connected
component (LCC) of the network after this removal, as proposed by Schneider et al. [9]. To quantify it, we proceed
2with a series of attacks and subsequently measure the robustness after each node removal. Hence, robustness R is
defined as:
R =
1
N
N∑
Q=1
S
(
Q
N
)
, (1)
where N is the number of nodes, Q is the number of nodes removed from the network, and S(q) is the size of the
LCC after a fraction q = Q/N of nodes were removed. The attacks performed are targeted to the nodes with highest
degree of the network: we find the most connected node, remove it, calculate S(q), update the degrees, and find the
new most connected node to repeat the process. In case two nodes have the same degree, we choose the one with the
smallest index. The value R is therefore unique for each network.
Efficiency
One can think of network efficiency as a low cost of communication among its members. In this light, we relate
efficiency with the shortest paths between all pairs of nodes, thus following Latora and Marchiori [6] who defined the
network efficiency E as:
E =
N∑
i,j=1
i6=j
1
lij
, (2)
where lij stands for the shortest path length between nodes i and j. If i and j belong to separate connected components
of the network, we set lij →∞ to guarantee a consistent behavior of the cost function.
Integral Efficiency
Keeping in mind that we would like to keep the efficiency of networks after attacks, it is straightforward to modify
the definition of E to account for this. Hence, we define Integral Efficiency IntE as:
IntE =
1
N
N∑
Q=1
E
(
Q
N
)
, (3)
where E(q) stands for the efficiency of the network after the removal of q = Q/N nodes. Nodes are removed according
to a targeted attack such as in Section . The value of E(0) is the cost function E defined in Section . By choosing
this quantity instead of E, which does not consider nodes removal in its definition, we try to avoid that the shortest
paths among nodes increases after targeted attacks.
Optimization procedure
In their work, Schneider et al. [9] propose a simple hill-climbing search to modify the network topology in order
to optimize the robustness R whilst keeping the degree of each node fixed. This restriction in often present in the
modification of artificial systems, such as electric grids where constructing a receiver for a new power line in a station
might be impractical. Hence, only swaps between lines (edges in the network) are possible. A consequence of this
restriction is that the underlying degree distribution of the network remains unchanged after swaps. Clearly, if we
had no constraints on the degree distribution, we could design the topology starting from scratch with the robustness
and efficiency as objectives in mind, obtaining different optimal topologies.
Next, we present an improved version of the optimization approach using simulated annealing and we describe it
for any cost function M that changes after link modification:
1. Initial State. Let G(N,E) be a network with |N | nodes and |E| edges.
2. Edge swap. Choose two pairs of edges (i, j) and (k, l) ∈ E randomly and create the network G∗ by deleting
the edges (i, j) and (k, l), and adding the edges (i, l) and (k, j).
3FIG. 1. Examples of networks belonging to each set. Networks are drawn using the k-core decomposition, represented by the
different intensities of gray.
3. Acceptance probability. Calculate the transition probability p of the system as:
p =


exp
(
−
M(G)−M(G∗)
T
)
if M(G∗) < M(G)
1 if M(G∗) ≥M(G)
4. Comparison. Make G = G∗ with probability p, otherwise discard G∗. Return to Step 2.
This approach allows a network G∗ with M(G∗) < M(G) to be chosen with finite probability. By doing this, global
minima could be reached and inferior local minima could be avoided. Notice that, for the three cost functions studied
here, the value of M(G) is unique for each network G. Furthermore, by decreasing the value of T according to the
amount of edge swaps executed, it is possible to decrease the acceptance ratio of worst networks when an optimum
point is close. We decrease the temperature as function of the number τ of edge swaps, by following the equation:
T (τ) = 0.0001× 0.8τ . Variations to this function have shown little effect on the results. The search is stopped when
a predefined amount of edge swaps is reached.
RESULTS
The procedure outlined in Section is applied to the cost functions: R (Robustness as described in Section ), E
(Efficiency as described in Section ), and IntE (Integral Efficiency as described in Section ), starting from the same
4TABLE I. Average values of the cost functions, standard deviation in subscripts. Each set comprises 100 networks with n = 1000
nodes. 〈k〉 = average degree, 〈cc〉 = average of clustering coefficient, 〈r〉 = average assortativity coefficient, 〈E〉 = average
efficiency, 〈R〉 = average robustness, 〈IntE〉 = average integral efficiency.
Network Set 〈k〉 〈cc〉 〈r〉 〈E〉 〈R〉 〈IntE〉
Unoptimized 5.950 0.02420.0033 −0.0850.015 0.14860.0012 0.18370.0053 0.03080.0011
E 5.950 0.00530.0014 −0.0760.011 0.15390.0015 0.18260.0056 0.03100.0012
R 5.950 0.02000.0027 0.0380.024 0.14590.0013 0.22660.0055 0.03720.0012
IntE 5.950 0.01950.0029 0.0550.026 0.14560.0013 0.22680.0052 0.03910.0012
set of randomly generated of Baraba´si-Albert (BA) networks. Hence, we created three sets of networks: Robustness
set, Efficiency set, and Integral Efficiency set. As a control, we compare to the original set of BA networks, from now
on called the Unoptimized set.
The Unoptimized set is composed of 100 networks of n = 1000 nodes and average degree 〈k〉 = 5.95. The size
of the networks was chosen based on a trade-off between the appearance of topological features such as the scale-
free phenomenon, only present in large networks, and computational cost, as the IntE cost function requires O(n3)
operations to be calculated. The amount of edge swaps, 10.000, was chosen so that for each optimized set its cost
function is already statistically different from the Unoptimized set. It is possible to see that this goal was achieved by
comparing the values in bold for columns 〈E〉, 〈R〉, and 〈IntE〉 in Table I. To provide a visualization of the network
structure created, some examples of each set are drawn in Fig. 1.
To analyze the robustness of each set, a plot of s(Q) versus Q is shown in Fig. 2, in which the area below each
curve represents R for each set. As expected, the Robustness set shows a bigger area (23% of increase), keeping a
considerable size of the LCC after several attacks. Indeed, Schneider et al. [9] obtained an improvement of almost
75% for this cost function, but by using a much more exhaustive approach: their search stops after 10.000 edge-
swaps without increase in R. Therefore, our results show that it is possible to increase network robustness using less
computational effort. The plot also shows that E, a cost function that does not consider attacks in its formulation,
has a bad performance in this scenario. We conclude that, though more efficient, networks optimized exclusively for
E might not be appropriated in a realistic context, in contrast to IntE, which considers both effects. Moreover, it is
interesting to note also that the curves for R and the Integral Efficiency set have comparable areas, considering the
standard deviation of the measurements as detailed in Table I.
In Fig. 3, the cost function IntE is analyzed through the plot of E(Q) versus Q, showing that, as expected, the
Integral Efficiency set has the better performance, i.e. the area under the corresponding curve is bigger. Interestingly,
the curve referring to the set of networks obtained by optimizing for E alone shows that both have about the same
performance as the unoptimized ones for this cost function (data on Column 〈IntE〉 of Table I).
Another interesting aspect of the work of Schneider et al. [9] is the topology obtained by this optimization: a
so-called onion-like structure. In this topology, each layer is composed of nodes connected with nodes of the same
degree, with few connections between layers. A direct procedure to generate this topology can be found in the work
of Wu et al. [10].
To investigate the presence of an onion-like structure on our optimized sets, three quantities were analyzed. In
Fig. 4, we show the k-core decomposition [2] for several k, showing that the Robustness and Integral Efficiency sets
have several k-core’s or layers, thus confirming a hierarchical structure of the network. The Efficiency set does not
present this clear hierarchy, but has more layers than the Unoptimized set. In the inset of Fig. 4 we show that the
Integral Efficiency set and the Robustness set of networks have the greater assortativity through the plot of Newman’s
r coefficient [7]; the Efficiency set is as dissortative as the Unoptimized set.
Finally, we also measure the robustness for each layer of a network. To do so, we analyze the sub-graph of each
network composed of Nk nodes with degree smaller of equal to k. In this sub-graph, Sk represents the size of its
largest cluster. In Fig. 5, we plot Sk/Nk for several values of k. This plot shows that the Robustness and the Integral
Efficiency sets present practically the same increase in robustness with respect to the Unoptimized set. In contrast,
the Efficiency set does not show any improvement with respect to the original scale-free unoptimized networks.
Given the several layers showed by the k-core decomposition, its dissortative nature, and the increase in robustness
of each layer, we conclude that the Integral Efficiency set also has an onion-like structure similar to the Robustness
set.
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FIG. 2. Largest component size after the removal of Q nodes. The area bellow each curve is the cost function R. Symbols
represent sets optimized for different cost functions and are larger than the standard deviation.
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FIG. 3. Network efficiency E(Q) after the removal of Q nodes. The area bellow each curve is the cost function IntE. Symbols
represent sets optimized for different cost functions are larger than the standard deviation.
6FIG. 4. Main plot shows the K-core decomposition for several values of k. It can be seen that the same network optimized for
IntE presents more layers than the network resulted after the optimization for R. Inset shows Box-and-whiskers plot of the
degree assortativity through Newman’s r coefficient. Thick lines depict the median value; lower and higher hinges gives the
0.25 and 0.75 quantiles, respectively; the whiskers extend to 1.5 times this inter-quantile range. Values outside this range are
considered outliers and appear as circle dots in the plot.
DISCUSSION
We outline here a procedure that optimizes a specific characteristic in any type of network and create three sets
of BA networks with distinguishable features. Though BA networks are known to be resilient to random removals
of nodes and present other interesting properties [1], we show here a method that creates networks with a certain
specific characteristic enhanced, which might be useful in some realistic scenarios.
Firstly, our results show that the Integral Efficiency set substantially improved efficiency after attacks, compared
to the Robustness, Efficiency, and Unoptimized sets. Moreover, this set also sustains a large connected cluster after
attacks. Therefore, this cost-function could be used to generate highly robust and efficient networks.
Another important result of our work is that networks optimized for IntE also present an onion-like structure. This
result suggests that this structure is generically the optimal scale-free net independently of the chosen cost function.
It also helps the design of networks from scratch, as it is possible to construct scale-free networks which present this
structure.
It is also interesting to note that the Integral Efficiency set maintains several similarities with the Robustness set,
such as: high assortativity, size of the largest cluster after attacks, efficiency after attacks, size of the largest cluster for
each degree layer, and a hierarchical structure regarding the k-core decomposition. In fact, the Integral Efficiency set
has a slightly better performance on assortativity and efficiency after attacks, while the Robustness set has a better
performance on the others.
Future works might focus on the structures of the three generated sets. The Efficiency set does not present an
onion-like structure, remaining unclear if this optimization could lead to a different structure. The Integral Efficiency
set might have a hidden feature that differentiates it from the Robustness set. By finding a typical structure of
optimized networks, new networks could be designed from scratch with a desired feature. Also, we would like to
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FIG. 5. Relative size of the largest component in networks composed of nodes of degree less than k. Symbols represent sets
optimized for different cost functions are larger than the standard deviation.
investigate other cost functions that might lead to onion-like structures, and the case of weighted networks, as they
are closer to real applications.
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